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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we propose a secure system model for 
interconnection between P2PSIP and IMS domains. The 
interworking solution is based on P2P-IMS GateWay 
(PIGW), which acts as a normal peer in P2PSIP network 
and a 3rd party IMS Application Server (AS) in IMS 
network. The security is achieved by implementing Chord 
Secure Proxy (CSP) and enhanced with subjective logic 
based trust model. We also implement this system model 
and analyze it in several aspects: number of hops and 
delay, trust improvement and protection against 
malicious or compromised intermediate peers. We 
conclude that the proposed architecture is feasible and 
improves security. As far as we know our research is the 
first study that proposes secure internetworking P2PSIPS 
and IMS. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, P2P computing has begun to infiltrate into SIP 
communication systems. The decentralized nature of P2P 
might provide distributed communication system without 
help of the traditional SIP server. In 2003, the SIPpeer [1] 
at University of Columbia and the SOSIMPLE [2] at 
William & Mary College were the first attempts to 
investigate the role of P2PSIP paradigm for 
communication systems. In the following years, the 
research has attracted great attention in both academia and 
industry [3-8]. IETF P2PSIP working group defines the 
motivation of P2PSIP [9]: The concept behind P2PSIP is 
to leverage the distributed nature of P2P to allow for 
distributed resource discovery in a SIP network, 
eliminating (at least reducing) the need for centralized 
servers.  
 
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is a set of standards 
under development by 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) in partnership with a number of other standards 
[6]. It uses SIP protocol to setup, maintain and terminate 
multimedia sessions. IMS is expected to be an important 
solution to the future All-IP network and infrastructure.  
 
Currently, researchers are beginning to study the 
possibility of interconnecting between P2PSIP and IMS 
networks. One typical proposal is described in [10], which 
implements a Gateway Application Server (AS) that is a 
peer in P2PSIP side and an Application Server in IMS 
side (shown in Figure 1). Through the bridge of Gateway 
AS, the users in different networks are capable to 
communicate with each other. The system model looks 
feasible from networking point of view.  
 
 
Figure 1. Interconnecting Model 
 
However, the proposed interconnection model faces 
serious security challenges. Firstly, the confidentiality of 
signals traversing inside P2PSIP overlay is not guaranteed 
due to the distrust among participating P2PSIP peers. Let 
us consider a typical malicious model (shown in Figure 2), 
which also specifies how Gateway AS interacts with 
destination P2PSIP UA (peer D) with cooperation of 
intermediate peers B and C. Peer B (the panda) that acts 
as a malicious intermediate peer in P2PSIP overlay is 
capable to misroute, discard, temper, and replay the 
received P2PSIP signals.  
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Secondly, Gateway AS is not secure enough since it is 
public to all P2PSIP peers, including malicious peers. For 
example, the panda is able to spy and record a profile of 
Gateway AS (e.g. peer ID, public IP, Port, etc.) through 
parsing incoming P2PSIP messages. Even if encryption is 
implemented, the incoming unencrypted parts of message 
header might still contain sensitive information (e.g. 
source IP, port, etc). This sensitive information privacy 
could be used to initiate DoS attack to consume resource 
of Gateway AS. Also, it might be used for SPAM attack to 
misdirect the system. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. A Malicious Model 
 
Therefore, in order to provide fully interconnected 
solutions, security issues should be taken into 
consideration, especially security inside P2PSIP network. 
In our design, we assure that following requirements are 
satisfied: 
 Networking availability. At least one trusted gateway 
for relaying signal between P2PSIP and IMS domains 
is available. 
 Security Guarantee. The message routing in P2PSIP 
domain should be security garanteed. Besides, the 
gateway should be resilient on a series of attack, e.g. 
DoS attack, SPAM, etc. 
In this paper, we investigate on P2PSIP and IMS technical 
issues and propose P2PSIP-IMS GateWay (PIGW) as a 
secure interworking gateway between P2PSIP and IMS 
domains. Security are achieved by implementing Chord 
Secure Proxy (CSP) and PKI-based certificate, and 
enhanced by subjective logic based trust model.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
introduce the interconnecting system architecture and 
corresponding solutions. After that, three typical use 
scenarios are provided in Section 3. Section 4 analyses the 
proposed system architecture on number-of-hops and 
delay, and security enhancement. We draw the 
conclusions and open issues in Section 5. 
 
2. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 
In this section, we first introduce a possible solution that 
offers secure interconnecting services between P2PSIP 
and IMS. Then, we specify the technical issue about the 
system model, including networking and security issues.  
 
2.1. Architecture Overview 
 
Figure 3 shows the proposed system architecture, which 
contains following five elements:  
 P2PSIP-IMS Interworking Gateway (PIGW) is the 
key interworking unit for translation of signals 
between P2PSIP and IMS networks. 
 P2PSIP peer, which can be a PC, laptop, PDA, 
mobile phones etc., is connected to the internet. Each 
P2PSIP peer has a corresponding CSP as its master 
node. 
 Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) is the secure proxy that 
relays the signals among PIGW and P2PSIP peers. 
The main task of CSP is to protect privacy sensitive 
PIGW.   
 Enrollment & Authentication (E&A) Server handles 
enrollment and authentication task when P2PSIP 
peers join P2PSIP overlay.    
 Secure Opinion Server (SOS) is the security 
enhancement server that handles dynamic opinion 
computing and storage task for each P2PSIP peer. 
 
 
Figure 3. Secure System Architecture  
 
Note that HSS (Home Subscriber Server) and CSCF (Call 
Session Control Function) are the basic elements in IMS 
core for SIP session establishment. Besides, CSPs and 
PIGW are pre-deployed backbone nodes in P2PSIP 
network. They are assumed to be trusted. In the following 
sections, we will specify technical approaches including 
networking and security.  
 
2.2. P2PSIP-IMS Gateway 
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P2PSIP-IMS Gateway is the key inter-working unit, acting 
as bridge between P2PSIP and IMS networks. PIGW acts 
as a normal P2PSIP peer on P2PSIP side and an IMS 
application server on IMS side. There are five 
components inside PIGW (see Figure 4): 
 P2PSIP Peer. This sub-component acts as a normal 
peer that receives/sends P2PSIP messages from/to 
P2PSIP network. 
 Translation Logic. This part handles translation 
between P2PSIP and IMS signals.   
 Forwarding Logic. This part decides which CSP 
P2PSIP message should be forwarded. It defines 
message routing strategy. For example, we can define 
the rule:”P2PSIP message is forwarded to a specific 
CSP that is anti-clockwisely nearest to the destination 
peer”. Inside this subcomponent, there is a database 
recording all the connections to CSPs (e.g. CSP ID, 
public IP, port, etc) in P2PSIP overlay. 
 IMS UA. IMS UA handles IMS client functionality 
that sends/receives IMS messages to/from IMS core. 
It contains UICC smart card for IMS authentication. 
 IMS Application Server. This part receives IMS 
request from IMS client and sends the corresponding 
response to IMS core.   
 
 
Figure 4. P2PSIP-IMS Gateway Internal  
 
When IMS Application Server subcomponent receives 
IMS request, the translation logic subcomponent will 
parse the signals, retrieve destination peer identity and 
generate corresponding P2PSIP message. After that, 
P2PSIP UA sends out P2PSIP request to a specific CSP 
on direction of Forwarding logic subcomponent. 
 
When receiving P2PSIP request, translation logic 
subcomponent will parse P2PSIP signals, retrieve IMS 
related information (e.g. destination IMS ID, etc), 
generate IMS signals, and forward to IMS UA 
subcomponent, which sends out IMS request.  
 
In consideration of security problem, we suggest that 
PIGW is only capable to communicate with CSPs. Since 
CSP is assumed to be trusted, sensitive privacy data (e.g. 
PIGW peer ID, public IP, port, etc) is revealed to most of 
P2PSIP peers. Therefore, it makes malicious peer difficult 
to initiate Denial-of-Service (DoS) and SPAM attack to 
PIGW.   
 
2.3. Chord Secure Proxy 
 
Chord Secure Proxy (CSP) acts as a secure proxy between 
PIGW and destination peer. Each CSP is responsible to a 
certain part of P2PSIP overlay. When receiving P2PSIP 
request from PIGW, it reveals sensitive privacy (e.g. peer 
ID, public IP, port, etc) of PIGW by encapsulating and 
sending out a privacy unrelated message towards P2PSIP 
overlay. For example, we define a session layer 
“PingRequest” message (See Figure 5) that contains no 
private information related to PIGW. The use of 
“PingRequest” makes sure that intermediate peers are 
incapable to receive sensitive privacy of PIGW. 
 
We propose CSP multicasts “PingRequest” to a few 
successors that are anti-clockwisely near to destination (as 
shown in Figure 6). “PingRequest” is forwarded based on 
Chord routing algorithm [11] hop-by-hop until the 
destination peer. Multicast mechanism guarantees to some 
degree that “PingRequest” message is resilient to message 
loss in case of compromised or faulty intermediate peers.  
 
 
Figure 5. “PingRequest” Message  
  
When CSP receives P2PSIP request from P2PSIP peer, it 
checks validity of request. For example, if the request 
initiated from a peer that is out of responsible range of 
CSP, it might be discarded. Only passing the validity test, 
the request would be forwarded to PIGW, which sends out 
to IMS core. 
 
2.4. Subjective Logic Based Trust Enhancement 
 
When Destination peer receives several “PingRequest” 
from different routes (See Figure 6), it needs to choose 
one of them for handling. We propose to use subjective 
logic based trust model [12] for selecting the most trustful 
route. 
    The subjective logic defines the term opinion 
},,{ udt , in which  t , d  and u  correspond to trust, 
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distrust, and uncertainty respectively. Subjective logic 
defines logical operators to beal with specific entities 
called opinions. For example, the recommendation 
operator   can be introduced to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of p which might be a statement like “the 
message traverse from A to B is unchanged results of 
measurement”, as following: 
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A  and  p
A  are two opinions about 
trustworthiness of A and B (for more details related to 
subjective logic the reader should consult [12]). 
 
Suppose that a request goes through the source peer A, 
intermediate peers 1B , 2B , 1nB , and ended in the 
destination peer nB . By applying the rules of subjective 
logic recommendation, the trustworthiness of this data 
flow is: 
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In our previous publication [13] we describe 
implemention of this concept and prove that this approach 
can efficiently enhance the security during P2PSIP session 
establishment. 
 
After computing the most trustful route, destination peer 
returns a session level “PingResponse” directly to source 
peer. Compare with “PingRequest”, “PingResponse” 
contains two additionally fields: destination IP and 
destination port. 
 
2.5. Certificate based Security 
 
IETF P2PSIP Working Group has suggested use Public 
Key infrastructure (PKI) based certificate in P2PSIP peers 
[4, 8]. Certificate proves the legitimacy of the specific 
peer and helps establish secure session. In additional to a 
few basic elements (e.g. version number, signature 
algorithm, digital signature of the issuer, etc), P2PSIP 
peer certificate might include P2PSIP related information: 
peer specific ID and one or more user names (e.g. 
alice@operator.com, etc). Centralized E&A server is 
supposed to issue certificate for each P2PSIP peer.    
 
The use of PKI certificate provides the data 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication among PIGW, 
CSPs, and P2PSIP peers. It could efficiently prevent the 
identity attacks (e.g Sybil attack, etc). 
 
2.6. Message routing  
 
We propose use Recursive routing (See Figure 6) for 
“P2PSIP MESSAGE” message transmission. In this 
routing, the request is initiated from source (IMS client or 
P2PSIP peer), forwarded by intermediate peers (including 
Gateway), hop by hop until the destination (IMS client or 
P2PSIP peer). The response (e.g. “200 OK”, etc) follows 
the same route back to the source. The implement of this 
approach could efficiently protect the privacy sensitive 
data from understanding by other P2PSIP peers. 
 
We also suggest Semi-recursive routing (See Figure 7) for 
“Ping” message transmission. The different with 
Recursive routing is that corresponding response is 
returned directly from the destination to the source. This 
approach reduces the total number of the message 
transmitted and therefore reduces the delay.  
   
 
Figure 6. Recursive Routing    Figure 7. Semi-
Recursive Routing 
 
2.7. Unreachable Target Notification 
 
The request initiated might not be able to reach the target 
due to a few reasons. For example, IMS client or P2PSIP 
peer might loss the connection with network due to the 
limitation of device capability (e.g. no power, system 
deadlock, etc) or network problem (e.g. no signal, etc). 
Therefore, it is necessary to notify the source when the 
target is unreachable. We propose that PIGW handles the 
notification task by sending “P2PSIP MESSAGE” and 
“SIP MESSAGE”. One typical example will be shown in 
Section 3.3. 
 
3. USE SCENARIOS 
 
In the following subsections we demonstrate the using of 
the proposed architecture for text based instant messing 
services, with three use cases. We define “P2PSIP 
MESSAGE” and “SIP MESSAGE” as the request, 
“P2PSIP 200 OK” and “SIP 200 OK” as corresponding 
response. Note that the proposed system architecture is 
able to be extendable for the other advanced services (e.g. 
presence services, VoIP, etc). 
 
3.1. Use scenario 1 
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Use scenario 1 (see Figure 8) describes how IMS client 
sends message to a P2PSIP peer. Possible message flows 
are: 
1. IMS client sends “SIP MESSAGE” message to 
PIGW (for example, 260 as P2PSIP ID and 
pigw@ericsson.com as IMS ID). 
2. PIGW returns “SIP 200 OK” to IMS client. 
3. PIGW sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” message to the 
specific CSP that is responsible for destination peer.  
4-6 CSP multicasts “PingRequest”, which is then 
forwarded by intermediate peers until the destination. 
7. Destination peer receives several “PingRequest” from 
different routes. It asks SOS server to select one of 
them. 
8. SOS server returns the most trustful route. 
9. Destination peer returns a “PingResponse” to 
corresponding CSP. 
10. CSP forwards original “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to 
destination peer. 
11. Destination peer returns a “P2PSIP 200 OK” the 
corresponding CSP.  
12. CSP forwards original “P2PSIP 200 OK” back to 
PIGW. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. IMS Client MESSAGE P2PSIP Peer 
 
3.2. Use Scenario 2 
 
Figure 9 describes how P2PSIP peer sends message to 
IMS client. Possible message flows are: 
1. P2PSIP peer sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to a 
responsible CSP.  
2. CSP forwards “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to PIGW (for 
example, 260 as P2PSIP ID and pigw@ericsson.com 
as IMS ID).  
3. PIGW returns “SIP 200 OK” to the corresponding 
CSP.  
4. Corresponding CSP returns “P2PSIP 200 OK” back 
to P2PSIP peer.  
5. PIGW sends “SIP MESSAGE” to IMS client. 
6. IMS client returns “SIP 200 OK” to PIGW. 
 
 
Figure 9. P2PSIP Peer MESSAGE IMS Client 
 
3.3. Error Handling Scenario 
 
Figure 10 shows the error handling use scenario when 
P2PSIP peer is unavailable to reach. Possible messages 
among source peer, CSP, intermediate peers and 
destination peer are: 
1. P2PSIP peer sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to its 
corresponding CSP.  
2. Corresponding CSP forwards “P2PSIP MESSAGE” 
to PIGW (for example, 260 as P2PSIP ID and 
pigw@ericsson.com as IMS ID).  
3. PIGW sends “P2PSIP MESSAGE” to P2PSIP 
network.  
4. Message retransmission after TTL. 
5. PIGW replys with IMS client with “unreachable 
peer”. 
6. IMS client returns “SIP 200 OK” to PIGW. 
 
 
Figure 10. Unreachable P2PSIP Peer 
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4. PROTOTYPE SIMULATION 
 
We construct a P2PSIP overlay of 512 P2PSIP peers, with 
496 P2PSIP normal peers, 15 CSPs and a PIGW peer. 
After that, we import IMS application server function to 
PIGW, which then acts as an IMS application server (with 
ims id: greetings@ericsson.com) and a P2PSIP peer (with 
id: 260). Apache Derby is selected as the embedded 
database implementation for P2PSIP peers, CSPs, and 
PIGW.  
 
We simulate IMS core network and IMS client by using 
Ericsson SDS 4.1 (Service Development Studio) and 
Ericsson IMS Testing Agent (See Figure 14) respectively 
[14]. We implement text based instant messaging service 
to show availability of proposed system with two use 
scenarios: IMS client MESSAGE P2PSIP peer, and 
P2PSIP peer MESSAGE IMS client. We manually define 
“P2PSIP MESSAGE” (Figure 11) as request and “P2PSIP 
200 OK” (Figure 12) as response. 
 
The system is deployed separately on a platform with 
Windows XP professional system, 2*2.4G Intel Core CPU 
and 3G memory. Wireshark [15] is used to monitor the 
message transmission. The testing shows that the system 
works well.  
 
 
Figure 11. P2PSIP Request 
 
 
 
Figure 12.P2PSIP 200 OK Response 
 
 
 
Figure 13. P2PSIP MESSAGE Peer 
    
 
Figure 14. Ericsson IMS Test Agent 
 
5. EVALUATION 
 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed system model in 
three aspects. We analyze number of hop, and measure 
latency to show that proposed system is feasible and 
efficient. Then, we analyze the security upgrading 
according to the comparison with previous related 
proposal in [10].  
 
5.1. Number of Hops and Measure of Delay 
 
We assume that the number of P2PSIP peers in the 
overlay is N , including S  CSPs. We first consider the 
number of hops in use scenario 1 (Section 3.1). According 
to Chord routing algorithm, the average number of hops of 
“PingRequest” is )/(log2 SN . In additional to 3 hops 
among IMS client, PIGW, CSP, and SOS server (as 
shown in Figure 9), the average number of hops in use 
scenario 1 is )/(log3 2 SN . As to use scenario 2 in 
Section 3.2, the number of hops is fixed as 3 (as shown in 
Figure 15). 
 
Then we measure delays in two use scenarios (Section 5.1 
and 5.2). We firstly select an IMS client (with ims id: 
alice@ericsson.com) as the initiator and randomly select 
20 P2PSIP peers as destination. We send the request and 
measure the latency between “SIP MESSAGE” sent out 
from IMS client and “P2PSIP 200 OK” received in 
PIGW260.  We get the average delay of 326ms. Using 
similar method, we get the delay of use scenario 2 of 
408ms.  
 
According to the result of num-of-hop and delay, it is 
convinced that the proposed interconnecting system 
architecture is feasible.  
 
5.2. Security upgrading 
 
In Section 1, we have introduced related proposal in [10], 
which faces serious security problem. In our proposed 
system, the security is greatly improved.   
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When P2PSIP peer initiates the request, it first contacts 
with its corresponding CSP, which relays the traffic to 
PIGW. Since CSP and PIGW are assumed to be trustful, 
the session is trusted. Therefore, the session initiated from 
P2PSIP peer is regarded to be secure.  
 
Then, we consider the situation when IMS client initiates 
the session. We initiate a P2PSIP request from IMS client 
(coco@ericsson.com), for destination peer 1618. The 
request would be directed to PIGW, and then CSP 1536. 
After that, “PingRequest” is multicasted on three routes. 
Although one route is unavailable due to malicious or 
faulty intermediate peers, the other two can still reach the 
destination (Figure 15).  
 
Based on the subjective logic (described in Section 3.4), 
SOS server calculates and chooses the most trusted route. 
Suppose that there are two route options. After 
calculation, SOS gets opinion result: 
}724.0,012.0,264.0{1 p  with v=0.605 
}826.0,005.0,167.0{2 p  with v=0.570  
After that, SOS returns the first route which has higher v.  
 
 
Figure 15. A Typical Use Scenario 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper we propose a possible secure architecture for 
interconnecting P2PSIP and IMS domains. The key 
interworking unit is P2PSIP-IMS GateWay, which acts as 
an IMS application server in IMS side and a peer in 
P2PSIP side. Security is mainly achieved by implementing 
Chord Secure Proxy, PKI based certificate, and subjective 
logic based trust. After that, we implement the prototype 
and analyze the system model based on the 
implementation. 
 
In the future, we plan to study the extension function of 
CSP to legacy devices (e.g. mobile phone, etc) that lacks 
the capability to access P2PSIP overlay due to limited 
protocol support or other limitation in device capabilities 
(e.g. available computing, bandwidth, etc). A system 
architecture proposed in [16] might be further extended.  
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